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Fantasmas e imaginación física en la teoría de la pictorialización de Husserl
Abstract: The aim of the article is to argue 
against the claim that Edmund Husserl does 
not adequately distinguish physical imagina-
tion from phantasy in his early texts. Thus, 
the article examines Husserl’s early theory 
of imagination according to which phantasy 
and image consciousness (understood as 
physical imagination) have a similar struc-
ture of pictorialization but differ with respect 
to apprehension contents and the number 
of apprehended objects: phantasy involves 
phantasms and two apprehended objects 
but physical imagination involves sensations 
and can have three apprehended objects.
Keywords: Physical imagination, phantasy, 
phantasm, content-apprehension-schema, 
Husserl.
Resumen: El propósito del artículo es reba-
tir la afi rmación de que Edmund Husserl no 
distingue adecuadamente entre imaginación 
física y fantasía en sus textos tempranos. Así, 
el artículo examina la teoría temprana de 
Husserl sobre la imaginación, según la cual 
la fantasía y la conciencia de la imagen (en-
tendida como imaginación física) tienen 
una estructura similar de pictorialización, 
pero difi eren respecto a los contenidos de la 
aprehensión y al número de objetos aprehen-
didos: la fantasía involucra fantasmas y dos 
objetos aprehendidos, mientras que la ima-
ginación física involucra sensaciones y tiene 
tres objetos aprehendidos. 
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INTRODUCTION
I n his early writings (until 1905),
1 Edmund Husserl discusses 
pictorialization [Verbildlichung] in the context of defi ning the 
difference between presentation [Gegenwärtigung], which de-
scribes perception, and re-presentation [Vergegenwärtigung], which 
characterizes memory, expectation, phantasy, and image conscious-
ness [Bildbewusstsein].2 Husserl believes that phantasy and image 
consciousness (understood as physical imagination) are examples of 
image presentation [Bildlichkeitsvorstellung] or imagination [Imagina-
tion] because they have the structure of pictorialization. In other 
words, Husserl holds the view that phantasy presentation [Phantasie-
vorstellung] is similar to image consciousness in that in both cases we 
can distinguish two objects: image and subject.3 He believes that there 
is an appearing image that depicts the subject in physical imagina-
tion (e.g., a photograph representing a child) as well as in phantasy. 
More specifi cally, the appearing “image object” in physical imagina-
tion is analogous to the “phantasy image” in phantasy.4 
However, despite these similarities, Husserl makes a clear 
distinction between phantasy and image consciousness. He distin-
guishes imaginings based on perception from imaginings belong-
ing to phantasy.5 He even proposes various concepts to capture the 
uniqueness of image presentation based on perception: “physical 
imagination” [die physische Imagination],6 “physical image presen-
1. I follow the commonly held view which posits that Husserl’s early theory encom-
passes the period from 1895/98 until 1905. The primary sources for the theory 
are Logical Investigations (1900-1901) and Husserliana XXIII, Phantasy, Image Con-
sciousness, and Memory. See also J. JANSEN, Phantasy’s Systematic Place in Husserl’s 
Work: On the Condition of Possibility for a Phenomenology of Experience, in R. BERNET, 
D. WELTON, G. ZAVOTA (eds.), Edmund Husserl: Critical Assessments of Leading 
Philosophers, Vol. III (Routledge, New York/London, 2005) 221-43.
2. Cf. J. BROUGH, Translator’s Introduction, in E. HUSSERL, Phantasy, Image Conscious-
ness, and Memory (1898-1925), Collected Works, Vol. XI, trans. J. BROUGH (Spring-
er, Dordrecht, 2005) xxx (from here onwards: PhICM).
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tation” [die physisch-bildliche Vorstellung7 or die physische Bildvorstel-
lung8], “perceptual imagining” [die perzeptive Imagination],9 etc. 
These concepts might appear to be contradictory to those unfamil-
iar with Husserl’s theory. However, it should be remembered that 
Husserl only wants to emphasize here the dual nature of physical 
imagination, that it “has a foot in both the perceptual and imagina-
tive worlds.”10
As is well known, Husserl later abandons the idea that phan-
tasy is a kind of imagination and has the structure of pictorializa-
tion. In his later texts, Husserl revises his theory and states that 
the phantasy appearance relates to its object straightforwardly and 
there is no phantasy image mediating in between.11 Given this, it is 
not surprising that philosophy papers focusing on Husserl’s concept 
of “phantasy” have had a predominantly critical approach towards 
Husserl’s early theory of phantasy understood as image presentation. I 
agree that Husserl’s early theory should not be taken as the Husser-
lian account of phantasy.12 It is problematic to use the terminology 
that Husserl used in his early theory of phantasy in explaining his 
later theory of it without refl ecting on the change of the meaning 
of these terms.13 However, I disagree that Husserl fails to draw a 
clear distinction between phantasy and image consciousness in his 
early texts.14 This would amount to neglecting Husserl’s attempt to 
describe the unique experience of the “physical imagination” that 




10. J. BROUGH, Translator’s Introduction cit., xliv.
11. E. HUSSERL, PhICM, 92.
12. J. JANSEN, Phantasy’s Place cit., 222. As she explains later, characteristic to the early 
theory is that phantasy and image consciousness are understood by Husserl as two 
kinds of the more general imagination [Imagination]. Ibidem, 224. 
13. As Ch. FERENCZ-FLATZ points out: “Thus, the association of image-conscious-
ness and phantasy under the same term of ‘imagination’ is characteristic only for 
Husserl’s position in the Logical Investigations and this is precisely why the render-
ing of commentators using this term for interpreting Husserl’s later statements 
are highly problematic”, cf. C. FERENCZ-FLATZ, The Neutrality of Images and Hus-
serlian Aesthetics, in “Studia Phaenomenologica” 9 (2009) 480.
14. J. JANSEN, Phantasy’s Place cit., 225.
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tions by means of phantasy images and presentations by means of 
physically mediated images are manifestly different kinds of experi-
ences, never to be confused.”15 Besides, Husserl’s theory of image 
consciousness—the experience of seeing pictures—remains basically 
the same from 1889 through the 1920s, with only small variations in 
his later texts.16 Thus, I fi nd that Husserl’s early theory of imagina-
tion and his theory of image consciousness as physical imagination 
both deserve a thorough study in their own right.17 In my view, as it 
is incorrect to maintain the parallelism between phantasy and image 
consciousness in discussing Husserl’s later account of phantasy, it 
is likewise incorrect to explain Husserl’s early theory of image con-
sciousness without distinguishing it from phantasy, or to examine it 
on the basis of how well it explains the experience of phantasy alone.
The aim of this article is to emphasize the uniqueness of physi-
cal imagination, and to show how it differentiates from both phan-
tasy and perception in Husserl’s early writings. To this end, I will 
focus on Husserl’s content-apprehension-schema, which plays an 
essential role in understanding his early theory of pictorialization. I 
will show that it is a mistake to claim that phantasms, which function 
as the contents for the “phantasy image” apprehension, are involved 
in physical imagination, as well as that there are only two appre-
hensions involved in physical imagination. In what follows, I will 
fi rst give an overview of the content-apprehension-schema and the 
concept of “phantasm” in Husserl’s early writings. Secondly, I will 
discuss the similarities and differences between phantasy and physi-
cal imagination, both taken as examples of pictorialization. I will 
show that there are two apprehensions needed for pictorialization 
to occur, but physical imagination, as a unique kind of pictorializa-
tion, involves one more—three apprehensions in total. I will also 
comment on some Husserl interpreters who claim that phantasms 
are involved in physical imagination. Moreover, I will show that 
15. E. HUSSERL, PhICM cit., 131.
16. J. BROUGH, Translator’s Introduction cit., xliv.
17. An important contribution has been made by John Brough. See one of his well-
quoted articles: J. BROUGH, Some Husserlian Comments on Depiction and Art, in 
“American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly” LXVI/2 (1992) 241-59.
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phantasms are not the apprehension contents for the constitution 
of subject, not even in phantasy. Lastly, I will point out some further 
details that contribute to the understanding of the uniqueness of 
physical imagination.
1. WHAT ARE PHANTASMS?
Husserl discusses the concept of “phantasm” in relation to the 
content-apprehension-schema [Inhalt-Auffassung-Schema].18 The 
schema is based on Husserl’s theory about the different modes 
of the relation of consciousness to its object. It is best explained 
in Logical Investigations, in which Husserl states that every repre-
sentation includes three parts: 1) the form of apprehension [Auffas-
sungsform], which defi nes whether the object is presented in purely 
signitive [signitiv], intuitive, or mixed fashion; 2) the matter of ap-
prehension [Auffassungsmaterie], which defi nes whether the object is 
presented in this or that “sense”; 3) the apprehended contents [aufge-
faßten Inhalte].19 Since contents are non-intentional by themselves 
and do not refer to anything until they are interpreted, “the content 
wins its intentional relation to something objective only through an 
interpreting apprehension.”20 
Husserl calls the content of perceptual presentation the “sen-
sation” [Empfi ndung] and that of phantasy presentation the “phan-
18. E. HUSSERL, PhICM cit., 323. It has also been called the matter-form schema. 
See R. SOKOLOWSKI, The Formation of Husserl’s Concept of Constitution (Martinus 
Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970) 105.
19. R. D. ROLLINGER, Husserl and Brentano on Imagination, in „Archiv Für Geschichte 
Der Philosophie“ 75 (1993) 204. Although Husserl adds to the defi nition of the 
form of apprehension that “Here also belong the differences between a perceptual 
and an imaginative presentation” [Cf. E. HUSSERL, Logical Investigations., D. MO-
RAN (ed.), vol. 2 (Routledge, New York/London, 2001) 245], he only wants to say 
that it is not the matter of apprehension that gives the difference between the two. 
When it comes to defi ning the difference between perception and phantasy, he is 
primarily interested, however, in the content. In other words, he is concerned with 
whether the content of perceptual presentation (sensation) and the content of the 
phantasy presentation (phantasm) exhibit some intrinsic difference independently 
of the form of apprehension (cf. R. D. ROLLINGER, Husserl and Brentano on Imagina-
tion cit., 205).
20. J. BROUGH, Translator’s Introduction cit., lvii.
REGINA-NINO MION
330 ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO 51/2 (2018) 325-345
tasm” [Phantasma].21 In Husserl’s view, the difference between 
phantasy and perception is neither in the degree of intensity of the 
content, as Brentano claimed, nor is it in the object, since the phan-
tasy presentation and the object of the perceptual presentation can 
be identical.22 Although Husserl believes that “[p]hantasms, too, 
are sense contents [Sinnesinhalte], and sense contents of the same 
genus and species as those to be found in sensation [Empfi ndung],”23 
the contents of phantasy acts, however, are not sensations [Emp-
fi ndungen] since in phantasy there is no actual physical object from 
which one can have sensations. The phantasy object is not per-
ceived, it is absent. 
It is generally well known that the distinction between sensa-
tions and phantasms concerns the distinction between perception 
and phantasy. Husserl refers to this in many of his manuscripts. For 
instance, in Husserliana X he writes that “We therefore distinguish 
perceptual appearances and phantasy-appearances. The latter con-
tain “phantasms” (re-presentational modifi cations of sensations) 
as their apprehension-material; the former contain sensations.”24 
What is less known, or less noticed, is that the distinction between 
sensations and phantasms also applies to the distinction between 
imaginings based on perception (physical imagination) and imaginings 
belonging to phantasy.25 Hence, the aim of my article is to draw at-
tention to these differences.
Before I come to the analysis of phantasms and physical im-
agination, I would like to note that Husserl had already begun to 
express doubts about the effi cacy of the content-apprehension-
schema around 1905.26 One of the reasons for the eventual aban-
21. E. HUSSERL, PhICM cit., 11.
22. R. D. ROLLINGER, Husserl and Brentano on Imagination cit., 199f.
23. E. HUSSERL, PhICM cit., 81.
24. E. HUSSERL, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917) 
(Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1991) 108.
25. E. HUSSERL, PhICM cit., 47.
26. Probably the most famous statement of it is from 1909: “I had the schema ‘con-
tent of apprehension and apprehension,’ and certainly this schema makes good 
sense. However, in the case of perception understood as a concrete experience, 
we do not fi rst of all have a color as content of apprehension and then the char-
acteristic of apprehension that produces the appearance. And likewise in the case 
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doning of the schema is that Husserl had diffi culties defi ning phan-
tasms. As Brough explains, Husserl cannot clarify the distinction 
between sensations and phantasms, and neither can he solve the 
question whether phantasms are present or absent.27 According 
to Brough, on the one hand Husserl claims that there is nothing 
“present” in phantasy. However, on the other hand, since phan-
tasms and apprehensions serve as representants for what is not 
present (the phantasy object), they must necessarily be present, for 
Husserl believes that something absent or non-present can be rep-
resented only by something present.28 Multiple problems arise from 
said contradictions. For instance, how is it that (present) phantasm 
“undergoes apperception into something that is not there itself”?29 
Moreover, how can there be any present contents in consciousness 
in the fi rst place?30 After a long struggle with the questions, Hus-
serl fi nally comes to the understanding that the real problem lies 
in the content-apprehension-schema itself. However, the content-
apprehension-schema still plays an essential role in explaining the 
of phantasy we do not again have a color as content of apprehension and then a 
changed apprehension, the apprehension that produces the phantasy appearance. 
On the contrary: ’Consciousness’ consists of consciousness through and through, 
and the sensation as well as the phantasm is already ‘consciousness.’” Ibidem, 323.
27. J. BROUGH, Translator’s Introduction cit., lix–lx.
28. Brough calls this the “prejudice of presence” according to which “one can be 
aware of what is absent only through something present” (J. BROUGH, Translator’s 
Introduction cit., liii.) That is why the content-apprehension-schema is also called 
an empiricistically infl uenced theory of consciousness: “This theory assumes 
present, experienced contents—sensations and phantasms—within consciousness 
(however they may have arisen)”. R. BERNET, I. KERN, E. MARBACH, An Introduc-
tion to Husserlian Phenomenology (Northwestern University Press, Chicago, 1993) 
260. Later, Husserl changed the view and claimed that the consciousness of what 
is absent “does not depend on the actual presence of some content or image in 
consciousness” (cf. J. BROUGH, Translator’s Introduction cit., liv.) Thus, even an 
absent object (in memory, phantasy) can be intended directly.
29. E. HUSSERL, PhICM cit., 201. “Are phantasms contents that appear as present? 
A peculiar question. Can they appear as present? If what is phantasied does not 
appear as present, does not the phantasm likewise appear as nonpresent?,” Ibidem, 
201.
30. This is related, as Jansen points out, to the analysis of internal time consciousness 
and the idea of absolute consciousness: “It is impossible for an absolute, a-tem-
poral consciousness to ‘contain’ present sensations or phantasms”, cf. J. JANSEN, 
Phantasy’s Place cit., 228.
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constitution of the image consciousness as physical imagination 
and the early theory of phantasy, as will be explained below.
2. PHANTASY AND PHYSICAL IMAGINATION: PICTORIALIZATION 
In his Göttingen period, Husserl gave a lecture course entitled 
“Principal Parts of the Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge” 
(in 1904/05). As J. N. Mohanty summarizes, the course had four 
parts: i) perception; ii) attention and specifi c intendings [Meinen]; 
iii) phantasy and picture consciousness [Bildbewusstsein]; and iv) phe-
nomenology of time.31 The third part of the course is (largely) pub-
lished in Text No 1 in Husserliana XXIII, Phantasy, Image Conscious-
ness, and Memory,32 and here Husserl ponders the possibility that 
phantasy is a kind of pictorialization [Verbildlichung], an idea that 
Husserl fi nds doubtful already by the end of the lecture course.33 
However, the idea is fascinating and reveals some of the important 
moments in the development of Husserl’s philosophy. 
Thus, in his early theory Husserl believes that phantasy is dis-
tinguished from perception in that the object of phantasy appears 
to us in image and does not appear as present itself, like the ob-
ject of perception does.34 To quote Husserl: “Anyone who phanta-
sies has an image experience. Something objective appears to him. 
However, no one considers this appearance to be an appearance 
31. J. N. MOHANTY, The Development of Husserl’s Thought, in B. SMITH, D. W. SMITH 
(eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Husserl (Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 1995) 57.
32. The fi rst two parts are published in Husserliana XXXVIII, Wahrnehmung und 
Aufmerksamkeit, and the fourth part in Husserliana X, Zur Phänomenologie des in-
neren Zeitbewusstseins [On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal 
Time]. 
33. In a footnote of the §8 entitled “Phantasy presentation as pictorialization. Begin-
ning the process of defi ning the essence of image presenting”, Husserl writes: 
“We intend to try to pursue as far as possible the point of view of imagination and 
the notion that phantasy presentation [Phantasievorstellung] can be interpreted as 
image presentation [Bildlichkeitsvorstellung]—although there is no dearth of objec-
tions to this attempt, objections that subsequently turn out to be justifi ed.” Cf. E. 
HUSSERL, PhICM cit., 18.
34. Ibidem.
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of the object itself.”35 Now, the re-presenting in image involves 
image and subject: the image presents the subject and the subject is 
what is meant by the presentation.36 This experience, however, is 
an image consciousness: “what resembles something turns into an 
image of it only through the unique and absolutely primitive image 
consciousness.”37 The term “image consciousness” [Bildbewusstsein 
or Bildlichkeitsbewusstsein] is often translated into English as “pic-
ture consciousness”38 or “pictorial consciousness.”39 The reason is 
probably that the term image consciousness is consistently used by 
Husserl to describe what he calls “physical imagination” [die physis-
che Imagination], and only occasionally used to describe phantasy (in 
his early theory). According to Husserl, physical imagination comes 
into play every time we look at a picture that has a physical basis, 
like a photograph, a painting, a drawing, but also fi lm and other 
moving pictures. Therefore, the terms “image consciousness” and 
“physical imagination” are often used synonymously.40 However, 
in Husserl’s early theory, both physical imagination and phantasy 
presentation are examples of pictorialization that are experienced 
through image consciousness. 
Physical imagination involves three objects: i) the physical 
image [das physische Bild] or the physical thing [Bildding]—a thing 
made from canvas, paper or some other materials (e.g., a painting 
called “Emperor Maximilian”); ii) the image object [Bildobjekt]—the 
representing or depicting image, also the appearing image (i.e., the 




38. Cf. J. N. MOHANTY, The Development of Husserl’s Thought; P. SHUM, The Evolu-
tion and Implications of Husserl’s Account of the Imagination, “Husserl Studies” 31/3 
(2015) 213-236; J. JANSEN, Phantasy’s Systematic Place cit.
39. Cf. R. BERNET, Unconscious Consciousness in Husserl and Freud, in D. WELTON (ed.), 
The New Husserl: A Critical Reader (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2003) 
199-219.
40. For instance, John Brough, the English translator of Husserliana XXIII, explains 
the threefold physical imagination in the section “Image Consciousness” (cf. J. 
BROUGH, Translator’s Introduction cit., xliv–li).
REGINA-NINO MION
334 ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO 51/2 (2018) 325-345
represented or depicted object (i.e., the Emperor).41 Phantasy, un-
derstood as pictorialization, involves two objects: i) the phantasy 
image [das Phantasiebild], and ii) the image subject [Bildsujet].42 Thus, 
as Husserl summarizes, “Three objectivities were interwoven in 
physical imaging; two were interwoven in phantasy.”43 
Husserl believes that physical imagination and phantasy pres-
entation are parallel cases of pictorialization since both involve 
image (he takes the image object [Bildobjekt] to be the analogue of the 
phantasy image [das Phantasiebild]44), and subject (the image subject 
[Bildsujet]). They differ with respect to the physical thing. As Hus-
serl explains, the physical thing, as a real object, belongs to percep-
tion’s fi eld of regard and functions as the instigator of the pictorial 
apprehension in the case of physical imagination; but “phantasy 
presentation has no instigator”45 and it means that the phantasy 
image is not tied to any physical excitant.46 
Another difference between physical imagination and phantasy 
is in the apprehension contents: sensations are involved in physical 
imagination and phantasms in phantasy. Since no physical instigator 
is involved in phantasy, the phantasy image is apprehended only on 
the basis of phantasms.47 To quote Husserl:
As far as the act-characteristics are concerned, the phantasy 
image and the physically presented image are internally of 
the same sort: There are certainly pictorial re-presentations 
in both cases. They differ, however, through their presenting 
sensuous contents. On one side, there are phantasms; on the 
other, sensations.48
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In fact, the physical image (or the physical thing) and the image ob-
ject apprehensions use the same sensuous contents, that is, the con-
tents are identical: “The same visual sensations are interpreted as 
points and lines on paper and as appearing plastic form.”49 There is 
a clear dependence of the image object apprehension on the physical 
thing perception: we have the sensuous contents to be apprehended 
as the image object by perceiving the physical thing that exists in 
the physical world.50 Therefore, it is absolutely correct to say that 
in the absence of the physical thing, “there would be no image con-
sciousness at all,”51 if by image consciousness we mean the physical 
imagination. 
Still, the clear dependence on the physical instigator has led 
some Husserl interpreters to question the parallelism between phys-
ical imagination (or image/picture consciousness) and phantasy. For 
example, Julia Jansen notes that the image object needs the physical 
image as the carrier of its sensual content, but in phantasy, “there 
is no such carrier to be distinguished from the phantasy appearance 
itself.”52 Moreover, we cannot say that phantasmatic contents are 
experienced the same way sensations are.53 Also, Peter Shum criti-
cizes Husserl’s early understanding of phantasy in that it leaves out 
the “picture-thing.” Shum refers to Husserl’s claim that one must 
be able to switch attention back and forth between image-object 
and picture-thing, and if so, then “the possibility in principle of 
turning one’s attention to the picture-thing is an essential part of 
49. Ibidem, 48. See also: “The same sensations are interpreted as a physical thing made 
from plaster and as a white human form.” cf. Ibidem.
50. Husserl believes that the image object, as well as the phantasy image, do not truly 
exist. What exist instead are the physical thing and the “complex of sensations,” 
cf. E. HUSSERL, PhICM cit., 23.
51. J. BROUGH, Translator’s Introduction cit., xlv.
52. J. JANSEN, Phantasy’s Systematic Place cit., 225.
53. Jansen is referring here to the same problem with the content-apprehension-
schema that was mentioned before, namely that how can something present be 
apprehended as something absent. To quote Jansen: “Further, it is problematic to 
assume that phantasmatic contents are present to us in the same way as sensations. 
If they were, it would be diffi cult to see how phantasmatic contents could ever be 
apprehended as something that is not present, that is precisely absent, namely the 
phantasized presentifi ed object.” Ibidem. 
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the structure of picture-consciousness itself.”54 Shum arrives at the 
following conclusion: 
If the hypothesis that phantasy has the structure of picture-
consciousness is true, then imagining, say, a landscape, implies 
the necessary possibility of turning one’s attention towards a 
picture-thing bearing the landscape’s image. The picture-thing 
itself must therefore be capable in principle of being constituted 
in phantasy. It would seem that we are then obliged to permit 
the possibility in principle of turning one’s attention towards a 
new picture-thing bearing the fi rst picture-thing’s image. But 
then we would be faced with an infi nite regress. The hypoth-
esis that phantasy has the structure of picture-consciousness is 
therefore showing itself to be deeply problematic.55
I would like to answer to the criticism by showing that even in the 
absence of the physical carrier, phantasy can still be considered an 
example of pictorialization according to Husserl. To explain this, a 
deeper look at the Husserl’s manuscripts is needed. In Chapter 2 in 
Text No 1 in Husserliana XXIII, Husserl fi rst claims that phantasy 
presentation is pictorialization because the object in phantasy ap-
pears to us in image.56 He then specifi es what the re-presenting in 
image means and claims that we need to be able to distinguish image 
and subject in it. Next, he claims (in §9) that physical imagination is 
a parallel case to phantasy presentation precisely because we can 
also distinguish image and subject in it. The only difference is that 
the concept of “image” is a double concept in the case of physical 
imagination. To quote Husserl:
When we distinguish between subject and image in this case 
[physical imagination], we immediately note that the concept 
of the image is a double concept. That is to say, what stands 
54. P. SHUM, The Evolution, op. cit., 222.
55. Ibidem.
56. E. HUSSERL, PhICM cit., 18.
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over against the depicted subject is twofold: 1) The image as 
physical thing, as this painted and framed canvas, as this im-
printed paper, and so on. In this sense we say that the image 
is warped, torn, or hangs on the wall, etc. 2) The image as the 
image object appearing in such and such a way through its de-
terminate coloration and form.57
Thus, Husserl suggests in these paragraphs that the essential ele-
ments of pictorialization are image and subject, and that the image as 
a physical thing is not essential for pictorialization to occur. Husserl 
clearly states that “In the case of physical imagination, a physical 
object that exercises the function of awakening a ‘mental image’ is 
presupposed; in phantasy presentation in the ordinary sense, a men-
tal image is there without being tied to such a physical excitant. In 
both cases, however, the mental image is precisely an image; it rep-
resents a subject.”58 This does not, of course, dispute the claim that 
the physical image is an essential element in image consciousness as 
physical imagination. It does, however, say that phantasy presentation 
without involving physical things is still pictorialization.
3. PHANTASMS AND PHYSICAL IMAGINATION
As explained in the last section, pictorialization involves image and 
subject, and the contents for the apprehension of image(s) are either 
sensations (physical imagination) or phantasms (phantasy). It was 
also noted that phantasms are not involved in the constitution of 
the two images in case of physical imagination. Now, what about 
subject? Can we say that there must be some apprehension contents 
57. Ibidem, 20. The same idea is repeated in the Appendix I for Text No 1 (pp. 117-
118). 
58. Ibidem, 22. In fact, some interpreters note that it is not the “physical thing” that 
is problematic in phantasy, but rather the “phantasy image”, that is, to fi nd the 
counterpart to the “image object” in phantasy. For instance, it has been claimed 
that Husserl later “distinguishes phantasy from picture-consciousness precisely 
by the lack of a counterpart to the picture-object in phantasy” (cf. J. JANSEN, 
Phantasy’s Systematic Place, op. cit., 226.), or to put it differently, that the distinction 
between image and subject collapse (J. BROUGH, Translator’s Introduction cit., liv.)
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functioning for the apprehension of the subject? And if so, are these 
sensations or phantasms?
The contents of phantasy acts are not sensations since in phan-
tasy there is no physical thing from which one can get sensations. 
A painting, for example, is a physical object that is present and per-
ceived, but we also see something in the painting that is not physi-
cally present, but absent. One might think that, in this case, we have 
both sensations and phantasms. This is suggested by Rudolf Bernet:
Translated into the terminology of Husserl’s early analysis of 
perception, this means that in pictorial consciousness there are 
two apprehensions, one based on the other, the fi rst of which 
is supported by sensations and brings the pictorial image to 
appearance while the other animates mere “phantasms” and 
thereby explains the givenness of the pictorial subject depicted 
in the pictorial object.59
A similar claim is made by Andreea Smaranda Aldea, who believes 
that phantasms must be involved in the second apprehension of 
image consciousness. To quote Aldea:
Furthermore, unlike the foundational apprehension of the Bild-
ding through which the appearance of the image object is fa-
cilitated, the apprehension of the image object as that through 
which the sujet is presented is a modifying apprehension. […] 
The sujet is given as irreal through and through. […] And un-
like the fi rst foundational perceptual apprehension, which has 
sensation as its content, the second, modifying apprehension 
of image consciousness has phantasma as content. Phantasmata, 
according to Husserl, are the contents of apprehensions that 
bring forth non-presence as irreality.60
59. R. BERNET, Unconscious Consciousness in Husserl and Freud cit., 203.
60. A. S. ALDEA, Husserl’s Struggle with Mental Images: Imaging and Imagining Recon-
sidered, in “Continental Philosophy Review” 46/3 (2013) 378.
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It is unfortunate that neither Bernet nor Aldea provide any refer-
ence to Husserl’s text that would support their claims about phan-
tasms being involved in the objectivation of the subject. What they 
say, however, is incorrect. It is not true, I would argue, that there are 
only two apprehensions in image consciousness according to Hus-
serl’s early theory. Nor is it true that phantasms are involved in the 
apprehension of subject. In what follows I aim to show three things: 
i) there are altogether three apprehensions in physical imagination, 
ii) the apprehension of the subject is not based on any apprehension 
contents, and iii) phantasms are not involved in the constitution of 
subject, even in the case of phantasy.
To begin with, Husserl refers to the “two apprehensions” only 
when he describes phantasy presentation, e.g., §11 “The relation to 
the image subject, or the two apprehensions, one built on the other, 
in phantasy presentation […],”61 or when he wants to point out the 
similarities between various kinds of imagination, e.g., §13 “The two 
apprehensions belonging essentially to the constitution of imagina-
tive presentation.”62 As I mentioned before, two essential apprehen-
sions or two essential objectivities of pictorialization (understood as 
“imagination” in his early theory) are image and subject. These two 
objectivities, image and subject, are necessarily involved in every 
kind of imagination, or in other words, the necessary occurrence of 
image and subject is what physical imagination and phantasy pres-
entation have in common. Now, as I also explained above, physical 
imagination is a special case of pictorialization, as the image is a 
double concept—instead of one image we experience two.63 These, 
the physical thing [Bildding] and the image object [Bildobjekt], are 
apprehended separately. Accordingly, since there are in total three 
objectivations involved in physical imagination (Bildding, Bildobjekt 
and Bildsujet), there must also be three apprehensions involved in 
it.64 As John Brough summarizes Husserl’s theory: 
61. E. HUSSERL, PhIC cit., 24.
62. Ibidem, 28.
63. Ibidem, 20.
64. Husserl often refers to “objectivation” and “apprehension” equivalently. For in-
stance: “In order to make two objects present, however, two objectivations, two 
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Finally, image consciousness involves not one, but as many as 
three apprehensions. […] These three distinct but inseparable 
apprehensions mutually achieve the constitution of the three 
entwined objects of the unitary depictive act.65
There are different interpretations of what are the (necessary) “two 
apprehensions” referred to by Husserl in his early theory of pic-
torialization. For example, Andreea Smaranda Aldea writes in her 
article that the structure of image consciousness [Bildbewusstsein] 
involves three objects: Bildding, Bildobjet and Bildsujet; and then she 
adds: “This would suggest three corresponding apprehensions for 
each of these objects, but Husserl discusses the structure of Bildbe-
wusstsein in terms of two apprehensions: one pertaining to the Bild-
ding and the other to the Bildobjekt-Bildsujet structural complex.”66 
It is unclear why she denies the fact that there are three apprehen-
sions that correspond to the three objects in image consciousness. 
But she also errs in suggesting how the necessary two apprehen-
sions of imagination are divided.67 In this light, Rudolf Bernet’s 
reading of Husserl’s early theory is correct with respect to the 
division of the “two apprehensions.” In the quotation given above, 
he claims that one apprehension corresponds to image (“pictorial 
image”) and the other to subject (“pictorial subject”).68 He only errs 
in leaving out the physical thing’s apprehension and in saying that 
these are phantasms that are animated for the apprehension of the 
subject.
Husserl believes that the physical thing apprehension and the 
image object apprehension use the same apprehension contents.69 
apprehensions, are needed.” Ibidem, 22.
65. J. BROUGH, Translator’s Introduction cit. lix.
66. A. S. ALDEA, Husserl’s Struggle with Mental Images, op. cit., 374.
67. A few pages later, she claims that “The Bildding and Bildobjekt are given in one 
apprehension—the former is perceptual, the latter marked by irreality.” Unfortu-
nately, this is not a correct interpretation either, and it also contradicts what she 
previously claimed.
68. R. BERNET, Unconscious Consciousness in Husserl and Freud cit., 203.
69. This might explain why Aldea thinks that Bildding and Bilobject are given in one 
apprehension (see the comment above).
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And Husserl explicitly states that the same apprehension contents 
give two separate apprehensions. To quote him:
The image object and the physical image surely do not have 
separate and different apprehension contents; on the con-
trary, their contents are identically the same. The same 
visual sensations are interpreted as points and lines on 
paper and as appearing plastic form. The same sensations 
are interpreted as a physical thing made from plaster and as a
white human form. And in spite of the identity of their sensory 
foundation, the two apprehensions certainly cannot exist at 
once: they cannot make two appearances stand out simultane-
ously. By turns, indeed, and therefore separately, but certainly 
not at once.70 
Husserl believes that the image subject is intended in a singular 
way. However, it does not have an appearance of its own; there is 
no second appearance in addition to the image (image object) ap-
pearance. This is because there are no contents left which could be 
apprehended as a new presentation or appearance. More precisely, 
Husserl claims that there are no apprehension contents left for the 
subject because all available contents are already used up in the con-
stitution of the image object. To quote him: “The new apprehen-
sion is not a new presentation: From where is it supposed to take 
its apprehension contents? All of the sensuous contents available 
have already been used up in the constitution of the image object.”71 
What happens is that the subject apprehension is founded in the 
apprehension belonging to the image object. Husserl explains this 
in the following way:
We have only one appearance, the appearance belonging to the 
image object. But we have more than the one apprehension (or, 
if you wish, the one objectivation) in which this image object 
70. E. HUSSERL, PhICM cit., 48-49.
71. Ibidem, 28.
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becomes constituted for us. If this were not the case, noth-
ing else but the image object could be meant. In the image 
object we image the subject, which is more or less different 
from—even if resembling—the image object: A second ob-
jectivating characteristic [objektivierender Charakter] is there, 
a new apprehension with a new apprehension sense that is 
founded in the apprehension belonging to the image object, 
and it is precisely this that brings about for consciousness 
what we express when we say: “With the appearing image we 
mean the subject.”72
And he adds:
Phenomenologically, however, it is inherent in this that the 
image object does not merely appear but bears a new appre-
hension-characteristic [Auffassungscharakter], which is perme-
ated and fused in a certain way with the original [and] which, 
as it were, refers to the object properly meant not simply at a 
distance from the content of what appears, but in it, or refers 
to the object properly meant through this content.73
In other words, the two objectivating apprehensions [objektivierende 
Auffassungen]—the image object and the image subject—are inter-
woven with one another, so that the intuition of the image object 
awakens a presentation of a new object (subject) which has an internal 
affi nity with, or resemblance to, the image object.74 Husserl also 
calls the apprehension of the image object the direct objective ap-
prehension [direkte gegenständliche Auffassung] and that of the image 
subject the indirect apprehension [indirekte Auffassung].75 
What is important at this juncture is that there are no sepa-
rate contents—neither sensations nor phantasms—available for 
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is apprehended, but nowhere is Husserl saying that the apprehen-
sion of the subject animates sensuous contents, let alone phantasms. 
In fact, not even in the case of phantasy are phantasms involved 
in the apprehension of the subject. In Appendix I for Text No 1, 
Husserl describes how the subject is given in the case of phantasy 
presentation: 
The new apprehension, however, is not a new presentation. 
From where is it to get its presentative contents? All of the 
phantasms (as we simply call the sensuous, experienced con-
tents of phantasy) are fully consumed in the presentation of the 
image. […] Thus the new apprehension, instead of objectivat-
ing new sensuous contents, can only make the fi rst apprehen-
sion into the foundation of a new objectivation.76
To some extent it is understandable why it is believed that phan-
tasms are the apprehension contents for subject because it seems 
obvious that sensations cannot be the apprehension contents for 
the absent image subject in physical imagination. Moreover, we fi nd 
texts in which Husserl writes that “imaginational apprehensions 
[…] belong to phantasms”;77 and he even ponders the possibility of 
mixed experience. He writes: “Furthermore, there is no doubt that 
we can experience sensations and phantasms at the same time, as 
when, for example, we read notes and accompany our reading with 
tone phantasms, or when we phantasy a melody while attending to 
our visual perceptions, and so on.”78 However, phantasms are appre-
hension contents for the phantasy image to appear in phantasy—not 
for objects in physically mediated images. A clear distinction is made 
76. Ibidem, 124. “Die neue Auffassung ist aber keine neue Präsentation. Wo sollte 
sie auch den präsentativen Inhalt hernehmen? Alle Phantasmen (so nennen wir 
kurzweg die sinnlichen, erlebten Inhalte der Phantasie) sind zur Präsentation des 
Bildes voll aufgebraucht; […] So kann die neue Auffassung, statt neue sinnliche 
Inhalte zu objektivieren, nur die erste Auffassung zum Fundament einer neuen 
Objektivierung Machen.”, cf. E. HUSSERL, Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung, 
Husserliana XXIII, E. MARBACH (ed.) (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1980) 114.
77. E. HUSSERL, PhICM cit., 85.
78. Ibidem, 81.
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by Husserl: “The apprehension of experienced sensuous contents—
of sensations in the case of the contemplation of a physical image, of phan-
tasms in the case of phantasy imaging—yields the appearing image, the 
appearing representing image object” [my italics].79 The distinction 
is also mentioned by Eduard Marbach in the editor’s introduction 
to Husserliana XXIII.80
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The aim of this article was to defend the uniqueness of the experi-
ence of “physical imagination.” I have claimed that physical im-
agination is distinguished from phantasy with respect to the ap-
prehension contents, as well as to the number of objectivations or 
apprehensions involved therein. More precisely, I have shown that 
although physical imagination is a kind of imagination, there are 
no phantasms involved in the constitution of its “objects,” and be-
cause of the double concept of image, there are more apprehen-
sions involved in physical imagination than in phantasy. However, 
there are further details concerning the difference between the two. 
For instance, Husserl states that in the case of imagining presenta-
tions, several essentially different apprehensions are based on one 
another [aufeinander] or in one another [ineinander].81 In this way he 
is referring to the idea that phantasy presentation is analogous to 
symbolizing,82 and as such “we have two apprehensions, one built 
on the other.”83 But pictorial presentations differ from symbolic 
presentations in that the pictorial presentations point to an object 
79. Ibidem, 24. See also Appendix I for Text No 1 in which Husserl states that phantasy 
presentation and physical image presentation emerge “from a differently con-
structed apprehensional basis.” Ibidem, 135.
80. “Und als möglichen inneren Unterschied der beiden Arten bildlicher Repräsen-
tation bringt er „die präsentierenden sinnlichen Inhalte”, Empfi ndungen bei den 
gewöhnlichen Bildvorstellungen, Phantasmen bei den Phantasievorstellungen, 
in Anschlag (S. 124).”, cf. E. MARBACH, Einleitung des Herausgebers, in Phantasie, 
Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague-Boston-
London, 1980) lvi.
81. E. HUSSERL, PhICM cit., 30.
82. Ibidem, 26.
83. Ibidem, 25.
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through itself, and thus we are “supposed to immerse ourselves in the 
image” [in das Bild hineinschauen].84 
Finally, I would like to draw attention to the fact that Hus-
serl not only has diffi culties in defi ning phantasms in the content-
apprehension-schema—whether they are present or absent—but he 
also notes that sensations may not help distinguish perception from 
physical imagination, for the same sensation contents function as 
the apprehension contents for both experiences. In my view, this 
shows that the problems with the content-apprehension-schema are 
not only related to the concept of “phantasm,” but also to “sensa-
tion.” Because of the perception of the “physical thing” that serves 
as the basis for physical imagination, Husserl expresses no doubts 
about the presence of sensations, and yet pictures show absent things. 
Thus, the important question is why the apprehension contents in 
physical imagination do not give us a mere perceptual apprehension, 
but instead the apprehension has the characteristic of representa-
tion by means of resemblance.85 In other words, why does not the 
picture (the painting, the photograph) “deceive” us, although, as 
Husserl clearly states that “the presenting contents are not generi-
cally distinguished from those of perception and consequently the 
corresponding appearances do not show any kind of essential dif-
ferences either.”86 Husserl adds: “It is precisely in this respect that 
the study of ordinary image presentations, sadly neglected up to 
now, proves to be extremely instructive. For the image here is the 
‘objectifi cation’ of sense contents, and yet this objectifi cation is not 
a perceptual presentation.”87 Hence the peculiarity and uniqueness 





87. Ibidem, 121. See also “In the imaginative presentation occurring in the contem-
plation of a painting, we certainly do have sensations as contents of apprehension. 
The result of the apprehension, however, is not a perception”, Ibidem, 27. 
88. This work was funded by the European Regional Development Fund and the 
programme Mobilitas Pluss no. MOBJD203.

